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ABSTRACT 
Almost  all labor supply models  are estimated  under the assumption  that 
workers are free to choose their  hours.  However,  theory,  casual  empiricism 
and survey  data suggest that  many workers  are not free to vary the hours 
within a job.  Consequently,  labor  supply  estimates  based on actual  hours of 
work may be biased.  Using  Canadian  data on desired  hours  of work,  we find 
that  using actual  hours causes  labor  supply  estimates  to be biased  upwards 
but the bias is small. 
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704 Commonwealth  Avenue  270 Bay State  Road 
Boston,  MA  02215  Boston,  MA  02215 Almost  all labor  supply  models are estimated  under the assumption  that 
workers are free  to choose  their  hours.  In contrast  there  exists  a wide 
range  of theories  which  suggest that employment  relations  will specify  hours 
as well as wages.  These include implicit  contract  models  in which workers 
wages  are  'insured" by the firm  while hours  fluctuate (see Lilien  and Hall 
1986 and the references  therein);  agency  and firm-specific  capital  models in 
which  wages diverge from  VMP in order to deter workers or firms from 
'misbehaving'  (Lazear  1979,  1981);  hedonic  models  with hours  of a job fixed 
either  because of the need for coordination  of workers or because there are 
fixed  "set-up'  costs  of working (Rosen,  1986);  efficiency  wage models in 
which firms set long  hours to capture  workers'  rents  (Bulow  and Summers, 
1986),  and costly  bonding  models in which the cost of bonding increases  with 
hours  worked (Lang  1987).  In sum theory strongly  suggests  that the 
assumption  that workers  can freely  vary their  hours on a particular  job is 
incorrect. 
Nevertheless,  relatively  little  empirical  work has been devoted to 
labor supply  models  with constrained  hours.  Two studies have used the Panel 
Study of Income  Dynamics data  on hours  constraints. Ham (1982)  estimates 
labor  supply  using  a sample  selectivity  approach  to correct  for bias due to 
some workers being  underemployed (i.e. working fewer  hours than desired)  or 
unemployed.  He finds  that correcting  the sample  selection  bias changes  the 
estimated wage  elasticity  from -  .16  to -.14.  However, this effect  appears 
to be due primarily  to the bias from  unemployment.  Failing to control for 
underemployment  appears to bias the estimated  wage elasticity  upwards by a 
11t appears that  unless coordination  requirements  completely  fix hours, 
this model  must be complemented  by legal  or social  restrictions  on firms 
ability to pay workers  hourly wages that  decline as hours  increase. trivial and statistically  insignificant  amount.  Ball (1987)  finds  that 
observed behavior  better accords  with predictions  of an intertemporal  labor 
supply  model  when workers who face  hours constraints  are eliminated  from the 
sample.  His  intertemporal  labor  supply  elasticities  are not significantly 
different  using the constrained  and the unconstrained  samples,  with the 
unconstrained  sample  yielding  lower  point estimates  of this elasticity. 
Two other  papers have addressed  tied  wage/hours  offers  without using 
direct  questions  on hours  constraints. Lundberg (1985) estimates  a 
wage/hours  hedonic locus simultaneously  with a labor supply  equation, 
finding  a significant  but weak effect  of hours  on wages.'  This suggests 
that while labor  supply  estimates  which ignore  hours  constraints  are biased, 
the bias may be small.  Dickens  and Lundberg (1985) develop a model in which 
the offer distribution  and labor  supply  are estimated  simultaneously  from 
observed  hours and wages.  In contrast  to the other  studies discussed,  they 
find that ignoring  hours constraints  significantly  biases the estimated  wage 
elasticity  upwards. 
While these  papers represent  significant  advances  in our knowledge, 
they all depend  on restrictive  identifying  assumptions  especially  with 
respect to nonlinearities  and functional  form.  These identifying 
restrictions  were necessary  because the data available  to the authors  was 
limited: none of the data sources  used included  direct  information  on 
desired  hours.  Thus,  some  of these papers  (Lundberg,  Dickens and Lundberg) 
were entirely  based on data on actual  hours and wages,  while others  also had 
data on the existence  and direction  of any hours constraints,  but not the 
'In addition,  Lundberg (1985), using panel  data,  finds that hours 
'Granger cause"  wages, which lends  Support  to the existence  of a wage/hours 
hedonic locus. 3 
size of the constraints  (Ham, Ball). 
This paper is able to reduce  dependence  on such restrictions  by 
directly considering  desired hours of work using  a Canadian survey  which 
elicited self-reports  of preferred hours  of work given  pro-rated salary 
changes.  We use our measure of the divergence  between actual  hours and 
desired hours to cast light  on the magnitude  of the bias which  results from 
using actual  rather  than desired hours in a simple  labor supply  model. 
Despite the fact  that we find considerable  evidence  of divergence  between 
actual and desired  hours, our point estimates  suggest  that the degree of 
bias from  using the former  as the dependent  variable  is small. 
I.  Methods 
The basic approach  we adopt in this  paper is kept quite simple.  We 
asswie a constant  elasticity  labor  supply  equation 
(1)  lnh,*X,B+blnwage, +c 
where h* is desired hours of work, X is a vector  of explanatory  variables 
and c  is an i.i.d.  random  error term. 
Typically,  we  do  not observe h* but only h, actual  hours.  The standard 
regression  equation is therefore 
(2)  in h = X,  B  + b  in wage  +  + 
where  is an error term representing  the deviation in h  - in h*.  If t is 
not orthogonal  to the explanatory  variables,  OLS estimates  of B and b will 
not be consistent.  Intuitively,  we expect  this to bias labor  supply 
elasticities  towards  zero,  since actual  hours  are likely to be much less 
This point holds mutatis mutandis if additional econometric  problems 
require  more  sophisticated estimation  techniques. flexible than  desired  hours  and hence less responsive  to  wages.  Thus, 
assuming  a positively  sloped  desired  labor  supply,  we expect  wages to be 
negatively  correlated  with  p. 
We take two approaches  to evaluating  the degree  of bias in labor supply 
elasticities  that use actual  hours.  First,  we investigate  whether  or not p 
is orthogonal  to the explanatory  variables in equation  (2).  Second,  we 
provide direct estimates  of the bias  by comparing  labor  supply  estimates 
using actual  and desired hours for some sub-samples.  We do not intend  to 
portray our results  as superior  labor  supply  point  estimates:  for instance, 
we do not attempt to deal  with nonlinearities  of the budget  set,  the 
intertemporal  nature  of labor  supply,  or any other  of a myriad  of problems 
in labor supply  estimates.  In  fact,  the wage data in our data source  are 
far from ideal  for estimating  labor  supply  equations,  as will be explained 
below.  However,  our purpose is only to give a sense  of the size of bias 
incurred  when estimating  an equation  such as (2)  based  on actual  rather than 
desired hours.  We argue  below that although  the imperfect  wage data leads 
to biased estimates  of labor  supply  elasticities,  it is unlikely to cause 
any substantial  bias in the difference  between labor  supply  estimates,  and 
thus should  not significantly  detract from  our estimate  of the bias 
introduced  by using actual  rather than desired  hours. 
II. Data 
Our data are from the Survey  of Work Reduction  (SWR) which was 
collected  as a written supplement  to the Canadian  Labor Force  Survey (the 
equivalent  of the U.S. Current Population  Survey)  in June 1965.  The 
questions in this survey  pertaining  to desired  work hours are included in 5 
the Appendix to this paper.  These  questions  are much more specific  than 
either  of the two major  U.S.  surveys  on hours  constraints,  the Panel Study 
of Income  Dynamics (PSID) and the  May 1985 Current  Population  Survey (CPS), 
which do not elicit  data  on the actual  numbers  of desired  hours.  Moreover, 
long introductions  to the questions  on desired  hours  of work reduction (see 
Appendix)  were designed  to ensure  that respondents  understood  these 
questions,  and especially  that they  understood  that the hypothetical  hours 
reductions  or increases  would imply  prorated  salary  changes.4 
Despite the considerable  effort  which Statistics  Canada  put in to 
ensuring that the data measure  what they are  intended  to measure,  there is 
ample evidence  of imperfections  in the data as in all surveys.  About 2% of 
respondents  both  wanted to work more and to work less.  In our analysis, 
these  respondents  were dropped from the sample. 
Other people  were dropped from the sample  because we could  not 
ascertain their  desired number  of hours.  Specifically,  those with NAs to 
the questions  about  how much they would  prefer their  hours to change  were 
excluded.  In addition,  a substantial  fraction  of respondents  said  that the 
reason  they  did not want to work fewer  hours  was that it was not possible  on 
their  job.  Respondents  who did not want to work more hours  and who 
responded that the reason  that they did not want to work fewer  hours was 
In  contrast,  the PSID questions  wording would leave  salaried workers 
uncertain about whether  hypothetical  hours increases  would be accompanied  by 
any salaries changes. 
1n addition,  outliers  who replied  that they wanted  to work more than 
72 hours per week were assumed to have  miscalculated,  and were replaced  with 
72 desired hours  per week.  Note that the maximum actually worked in the 
sample  was 65 hours  per week,  and the arbitrarily  chosen  72 hours  was 1  hour 
more per day than this maximum. 6 
because  it was not possible  on their jobs were also eliminated  from the 
sample  because it was impossible  to determine  their  desired  hours.  This 
removed roughly  one-eighth  of the observations  from the sample. 
A final  concern arises  about  whether  or not the respondents  interpreted 
the questions  as intended,  despite  the questionnaires elaborate 
introduction.  The survey  posed a series  of follow-up  questions  about  how 
important  various  factors  were in causing  the respondent  to want to work 
fewer  hours.  About half  of respondents  who said they wanted  to work fewer 
hours  said that  a very or somewhat important  reason  for their  wanting to 
work fewer  hours  was to reduce  the probability  of being laid-off.  Clearly, 
this reason  for wanting to work less does not correspond  to our concept of 
wanting to supply  fewer  hours at the going  wage.  Moreover,  in the 
introduction  to the survey  respondents  had been explicitly  told to assume 
that the hypothetical  hours reductions  would  not affect  their  job security 
or job situation  in general. 
However, it is unclear that the implied importance  of layoff avoidance 
should  be taken  a face value for two reasons.  First,  even those respondents 
who claimed that not getting laid-off  was an important  reason  for wanting to 
reduce hours  generally  gave a number  of other important  reasons for wanting 
to reduce  hours.  Secondly,  the survey  was preceded  by a prologue  which 
explained that the reason  the survey was being  conducted was  to examine the 
possibility of reducing unemployment  by having  workers voluntarily reduce 
their hours  of work.  This might have  made the possibility  of unemployment 
salient in their  minds  when asked  specifically  whether reducing  the 
probability  of being laid  off was a factor. 
Despite these  concerns,  the data used here appear to be the only 7 
measures of desired  hours  available.  Moreover,  the wording of the SWR 
questions and their introductions  generally  introduce fewer ambiguities  than 
the other surveys'  questions. 
The wage data in the SWR pose much more serious  problems.  The survey 
does not collect specific figures  for wages  or income.  Instead,  respondents 
are asked to place  their (total) own income  into  one of seven  bracketed 
ranges.  Translating  the categorical  income  variable into a continuous  wage 
variable is by no means straight-forward  First  of all, the income  figures 
must be divided by hours.  The SWR asked  questions  both on usual  weekly 
hours  and hours last  week.  As is often  the case,  it is unclear  whether 
usual  weekly hours includes  'normal"  overtime.  We therefore  experimented 
with both "hours'  variables.  Second,  the decision  had to be made whether 
and how to translate  the brackets into  a continuous  variable.  To ascertain 
how much information  was  lost by constructing  a continuous  index  from this 
categorical  data,  we compared  specifications  for nonunion  men including  six 
income  dummy variables  to specifications  using one of two continuous  income 
variables,  the first  using  midpoints  of the brackets  and the second  using a 
simple index  where 1 was  the lowest  wage category,  2  the second,  etc.' 
Resulting  F tests  suggested  that little  information  was lost by treating the 
categorical  variable  as continuous.  Of the two continuous  income  variables, 
the simple  index had more explanatory  power.  Results  were similar  whether 
hours were measured  as usual hours  or desired  hours.  We therefore  estimated 
"We limited  experimentation  to nonunion  men to lessen  any problems  of 
"data mining." 
'These measures  are not very different  except  for scale,  since  all 
income  brackets were equal sized ($10 thousand  Canadian)  except  the  lowest 
($0 - $20thoosand)  and the highest $70+  thousand (assigned  a midpoint of $80 
thousand).  Scale is irrelevant  since all specifications  were in log form. 8 
the log wage as log(income  index/hours  last  week). 
Bracketed  data reduces  the accuracy  of our estimates,  but does not 
introduce inconsistency.  However, other  aspects  of the constructed  wage 
variable do introduce  inconsistency. Most significant  is the fact that 
hours are included  in the denominator  which  will cause  a spurious  negative 
correlation  between  the wage variable  and the error term in equation (2). 
In addition,  income  includes  non-labor  income,  which  may be correlated  with 
the error term. 
To mitigate the latter  two problems,  we use instrumental  variables  with 
twenty-eight  occupation  dummy  variables  as instruments  for wage.  To the 
extent that  occupation  affects hours  only via the wage, inconsistency  is 
eliminated.  However,  occupation  dummies  are not ideal instruments  for wage, 
since there is likely  to be some correlation  between occupation  and hours 
(both  desired or actual) not due to wage differences.  (For instance,  the 
inherent propensity  towards workaholism  might  belong in labor  supply 
equation but is, of course,  unmeasurable.  However,  workaholism  may be 
correlated  with  occupation.)  This correlation  between occupation  and hours 
implies that instrumented  wages,  a linear  combination  of the occupation 
dummies, is still  somewhat negatively  correlated  with the error term.  Thus, 
using occupation  to instrument  wages is likely to reduce  but not eliminate 
the bias due to hours  in the denominator  of the wage measure.  Partially 
because of the lack  of perfect instruments  for wage,  we also consider 
reduced form labor supply  equations in which wages  have been eliminated. 
The bias is further reduced by concentrating on  the results  of 
equations where  i,  the  difference  between actual  and desired hours, is the 
dependent  variable.  Asymptotic  bias will occur  only to the extent  that 9 
over-  or under-employment  in particular  occupations  is correlated  with the 
average  hours  in those  occupations  for reasons  unrelated  to wages. 
Intuitively,  there seems  no reason  to expect such a correlation. 
On the other hand,  the bias from including  nonlabor income  with labor 
income  should  be solved  by instrumenting  wages  with occupation,  since 
occupation  is unlikely  to be significantly  correlated  with nonlabor  income. 
In the case  of women, almost  all respondents  indicated  that they were 
in the first  or second  income category.  As a consequence  almost  of the 
variation  in estimated  wages would  be due to variation in hours,  and it is 
impossible  to estimate  the labor supply-wage  relationship.  Therefore,  for 
women, only reduced form  equations excluding  wage are reported. 
The remaining  variables  used in this study  are URBAN,  a dummy  variable 
equal  to 1  if the individual  lives in an urban  area,  MARRIED, a dummy 
variable  equal to 1 if the  individual  is presently  married, AGE measured in 
10 year intervals,  CHILDREN, the number  of children in the household  under 
age fourteen's, four dummy  variables  for education  levels,  no education 
beyond  primary school  being the  left out variable  and UNION,  a dummy 
variable if the worker is covered by a collective  bargaining  agreement. 
We limited  the sample  to individuals  who were employed in the private 
nonagricultural  sector  who were age 25-64  and  for whom a complete  set of 
data were available. 
III. Results 
The responses indicate  considerable  divergence  between actual  and 
However, if there were more than three  children in any one category 
(five  or less,  6-11, 12-14), the survey  recorded  only three  children for 
that  age group. 10 
desired  hours.  Just over half of respondents  would like to work a different 
number  of hours at their  present  wage.  Of these, over two-thirds  would like 
more hours.  The difference  between  the proportion  wanting to work more and 
those  wanting to work less  is somewhat  more  pronounced  for nonunion  men than 
it is for union  men or women.  (See Table  I)  Of those  expressing  a preferred 
number  of hours,  the average nonunion  male worker  wanted  to work 3.8 more 
hours than  he actually  worked, while on average  union  male workers  and women 
workers  wanted to work 3.0 and 3.7 more  hours,  respectively. 
Responses  to the question  about  wanting to work more, fewer or the same 
number  of hours  appear to be somewhat  but not qualitatively  different  from 
those  obtained in the United  States  CPS in May 1985 (Shank  1986).  In the 
CPS,  on average 64.8% of wage and salaried  workers  wanted to work the same, 
7.5% wanted to work less,  and 27.7%  wanted  to work more.  Thus,  in Canada, 
it seems  that a somewhat lower  proportion  of workers  are satisfied  with 
their present  hours,  and that  of those who would like to change  their  hours, 
in Canada  a somewhat  higher  proportion  want to work fewer  hours.  We can 
only speculate  whether these differences  are due to the wording of the 
questions in the surveys in the two countries  or to actual  U.S.-Canada  labor 
market differences. 
As discussed in Section I,  labor supply  estimates  using the  log of 
actual  hours h rather  than desired  hours h* are likely  to be biased only if 
the deviation  between  ln h* and ln  h,.  or  i  in equation (2), is orthogonal 
to the explanatory  variables in the labor  supply  equation.  Table II, 
columns  (1)-(3),  gives the results from regressing  p.  the difference 
between log actual  hours  worked and log desired hours  worked, on exogenous 
variables  besides wage typically  included  in labor  supply  equations,  while 11 
columns (4) and (5) give the results  including  wage (instrumented)  as well. 
Since the wage variable  cannot  be constructed  for women,  only the reduced 
form estimates in Table II allow  us to compare  all three  demographic  groups, 
union  men, nonunion  men and women.  For each of these  three groups  the 
explanatory  variables  in columns  (l)—(3)  are jointly significant  although 
their explanatory  power is small. 
Table II indicates  that higher  wages  increase  the extent  to which 
individuals  work more than they wish to.  Thus,  in columns  (1) and (2) 
those  variables which  raise  wages also increase ,  the  log(actual 
hours/desired  hours),  consistent  with the positive  significant  coefficients 
on wage in columns  (4) and (5).  Nevertheless,  the magnitude  of this wage 
effect is quite small  and is statistically  insignificant  in the case of 
union  men.  The small  positive  point estimates  of the effect  of wage on 
implies that labor supply  elasticities  for men are slightly biased  upwards: 
i.e.  ,  the  true labor  supply  curve  based  on desired  hours (equation  1) is 
steeper than the  labor  supply  equation  based  on actual  hours (equation  2), 
since low wage workers tend to desire  to work (on average)  more extra  hours 
than do high wage workers.  This  bias is in the opposite direction  from that 
expected a priori. 
For women, the Table II coefficients  generally tell  a similar  if less 
consistent  story:  most but not all variables  which raise  wages also tend to 
increase i, and  thus  decrease  underemployment,  the tendency  to want to work 
more.  This is particularly  clear in the case of education.  The exceptions 
are the "married'  variable,  which is generally  negatively  correlated  with 
Additional  tabulations  (not shown) demonstrate  that this reflects  both 
an increase in the fraction  wanting to work less and a decrease in the 
fraction  wanting to work more as wages  rise. 12 
wages  for women  but here,  decreases  underemployment  and age which has no 
effect. 
Age is the only other coefficient  which is statistically  significant 
for both nonunion  and union men when  wage is included in the equations. 
Overemployment  (actual  minus desired  hours)  increases  with age.  To the 
extent that  age proxies tenure,  this is the opposite of what is predicted  by 
the Lazear (1979,  1981)  agency  model  where  wages exceed  VMP later in the 
work relation  to deter  cheating,  so that more senior  workers wish to work 
more hours than the contract  permits.  On the other  hand,  the finding  is 
consistent  with specific-capital  models  in which workers  and firms  share the 
investment  so that VMP exceeds the wage for senior  workers.'° 
To check  whether  the Table IT results  are reasonable  despite  the 
imperfect  wage measure  and instruments,  Table  III reports  the labor  supply 
equations  underlying  the last two columns  of Table II.  Elasticities  from 
the labor  supply  equations  of log(actual  hours)  are close to zero  and in the 
general range  of unsophisticated  labor  supply  estimates  using better  wage 
data reviewed in Killingsworth  (1983).  This suggests that  the downwards 
bias on the elasticity  estimates  from  using  the poor wage measure  is not 
too great.  It Is likely  that problems  due to the poor wage measure  are very 
small even in the labor supply  equations,  where we would expect its effect 
to be much greater than in the equations  of log(actual/desired  hours).  This 
therefore  lends  credence to our estimates  in Table IT. 
'°For  a  more detailed  consideration  of this point  using U.S. data see 
Kahn and Lang (1987). 13 
IV. Conclusion 
Despite our finding that the majority  of workers desire to work a 
different  number  of hours from that  which  they actually  work and that a 
strong  majority  of these are underemployed,  our findings  generally  suggest 
that the implications  for studies  of labor  supply  are fairly  modest.  The 
bias from using  actual  rather than desired hours is on the order of .05 or 
.1.  This small  bias is consistent  with Ball (1987),  Ham (1982) and Lundberg 
(1985). 
Moreover, in contrast to what might  have  been expected,  labor  supply 
elasticities  appear  to be lower  using desired rather than actual  hours.  If 
hours constraints  simply  made workers'  actual  hours inflexible  compared  to 
their desired  hours, for instance if hours  are fixed at forty  hours  per 
week,  we would expect  desired  hours  to respond  more sharply to wage 
differences  than actual  hours.  However,  the bias observed is in the 
opposite direction.  The bias results  from  a positive correlation  between 
[log(actual/desired  hours)j  and wages that  results from fewer  higher  wage 
workers than lower  wage  workers wanting to work more,  more wanting to work 
less.  This finding  calls for further  theoretical  and empirical  study 
consideration.  It implies that  a positively  sloped  relationship  between 
actual  hours and wages may,  at least  partially,  be the result  of employers 
preferring  low wage workers to work fewer hours than desired while 
preferring high  wage workers to work additional  hours,  rather than the 
result  of labor  supply  responses. 14 
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APPENDIX 
The question  about reduced  work hours  was preceded  by the following 
preamble: 
"The following  questions  are about working less time for  less pay. 
Assume that  you would lose one hours pay for each  hour that you no 
longer  work.  Put another  way, you would lose 5% of your  pay if you 
work 5% less time.  When you are answering  the question,  assume that 
your job situation  stays the same.  Your job security  would  not be 
affected.  You would  not jeopardize  your chances  for promotion  or pay 
raises.  You wouldn't  lose your  pension or other benefits." 
The first question  was: 
"In  the next two years, would you take  a cut in pay if you received 
more time off in return?' 
Those who answered 'no"  were asked "Why  not?'  with reply  categories  "Can't 
afford it,"  "Like  my hours  now,"  "Not possible  in my job,"  and "Other 
reason." 
Those who answered  "yes"  were told: 
"Think  about  how much of your pay you could afford  to give up to work 
less  time.  Remember,  for every hour less  you work,  you would lose  one 
hour's  pay.  Before  answering the next  question,  here are some figures 
to help you:  A week off is about 2% of a full  work year (and 2% of 
your pay);  two weeks  would  be 4%; three  weeks  would be 6%.  A half hour 
less per day all week long for a full  work year is about 6% of your 
time and pay; one hour a day would  be 12%; two hours  a day would be 
24%.  One day off every week all year long is about  202 of a full  work 
year (and 20% of your  pay);  two days  off would be 40%; two and a half 
days  would be 50%.  If you worked for 4 years at reduced  pay in order 
to have the fifth  year off,  you would  be reducing  your  pay by 20%.  Use 
the chart below  to help you think about  these figures." 
A chart relating  percent  pay cuts to dollar  cuts for different  salary  levels 
followed. 
Respondents  who had answered "no"  to the first  question  were then  asked 
"What percent  of  your  pay  would  you  give  up  to  have  more  time  off?" 
All respondents  were asked: 
"If you continue  to be paid at the same  rate of pay that you are now, 
would you work more hours for more pay?" 
Respondents  who answered  "yes"  were then  asked: 
"How  many more hours  per week would you want to work?" TABLE  I 
DESIRED HOURS  OF WORK  RELATIVE  TO ACTUAL  WORK 
Nonunion  Men  Union Men  Women 
WANTS MORE  40.6  33.0  32.0 
SAME  45.5  50.4  51.1 
WANTS LESS  13.8  16.6  16.9 TABLE II 
DETERMINANTS  OF  LOG  (ACTUAL  HOURS/DESIRED  HOURS) 
I-statistics are  in parentheses 
Reduced  Form  Estimates  IV  Esttmates* 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Non-Union Men  Union Men  Non-Un. Men  ILtt  Men 
URBAN  0010  0.007  0.016  -0.011  0.003 
(1.1)  (0.6)  (1.3)  (1.0)  (0.2) 
MARRIED  0.040  0.003  0.035  0.028  -0.001 
(3.4)  (0.2)  (2.7)  (2.2)  (0.0) 
AGE/b  0.028  0.023  -0.003  0.019  0.020 
(6.3)  (3.5)  (0.4)  (3.7)  (2.8) 
(SOME) HIGH SCHOOL  0.033  0.041  0.020  0.010  0.031 
(2.5)  (2.6)  (0.9)  (0.7)  (1.8) 
SOME POST-SECONDARY 0.033  0.039  0.043  0.007  0.024 
(1.9)  (1.5)  (1.6)  (0.3)  (0.8) 
POST-SEC.  DIPLOMA  0.039  0.061  0.047  -0.007  0.043 
(2.5)  (2.8)  (2.0)  (0.3)  (1.6) 
UNIVERSITY  0.071  0.100  0.086  0.007  0.077 
(4.5)  (3.6)  (3.1)  (0.3)  (2.3) 
CHILDREN  -0.004  -0.002  -0.020  -0.007  -0.003 
(0.9)  (0.2)  (3.1)  (1.6)  (0.4) 
UNION  -  -  0.045 
(3.3) 
LOG  WAGE  -  -  -  0.091  0.045 
(4.0)  (0.4) 
0.032  0.022  0.015 
Mean of dependent  -0.081  -0.067  -0.110  -0.081  -0.067 
Variable 
2239  1267  2793  2239  1267 
First-stage regressors  include all explanatory  variables  except  log wage  plus 
28 occupation  dummy variables. _________________  UNION MEN 
__________  ___________  Log  Actual  Log Desired 
0.016  -0.029 
(0.4)  (0.6) 
-0.037  -0.040 
(2.4)  (2.6) 
0.066  0.067 
(2.9)  (2.9) 
0.006  -0.014 
(0.6)  (1.7) 
0.014  -0.018 
(0.6)  (0.8) 
-0.045  -0.069 
(1.2)  (1.9) 
0.022  -0.021 
(0.7)  (0.6) 
0.060  -0.018 
(1.4)  (0.4) 
0.001  0.003 
(0.2)  (0.4) 
T-statistics  in  parentheses. 
First-stage  regressors  include all explanatory  variables  except  log wage  plus 
28 occupation  dummy  variables. 
TABLE  III 





(SOME) HIGH SCHOOL 
SOME  POST-SECONDARY 
POST-SEC.  CERTIFICATE 
UNIVERS  Ifl 
CHILDREN 
NONUNION  MEN 
Loz Actual  Log Desired 
0.046  -0.045 
(1.5)  (1.5) 
-0.019  -0.009 
(1.3)  (0.6) 
0.056  0.028 
(3.2)  (1.7) 
-0.009  -0.027 
(1.2)  (4.1) 
0.011  0.001 
(0.5)  (0.0) 
0.014  0.007 
(0.5)  (0.3) 
0.001  0.007 
(0.0)  (0.3) 
-0.024  -0.032 
(0.8)  (1.0) 
0.003  0.010 
(0.5)  (1.7) 